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Why do History Politics Matter?
The Case of the Estonian
Bronze Soldier 
 PILVI TORSTI
In my earlier work I have developed the various concepts and phenom e na 
related to the presence of history.1 In this article I attempt to analyse the 
Estonian Bronze Soldier dispute in spring 2007 as an example of history 
politics and other phenomena related to the presence of history. Finally I 
shall close with a discussion of the signifi cance of history politics through 
analysing the consequences of history politics in Estonia and elsewhere.
THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN THE ESTONIAN BRONZE SOLDIER CASE
In 1947, a statue of a bronze soldier was erected in the capital of Estonia, 
three years after the arrival of Soviet troops and defeat of the Nazis. It 
was a Soviet war memorial, ‘a Monument to the Liberators of Tallinn’. 
It was located in a park in central Tallinn above a burial site of Soviet 
soldiers’ remains, which had been reburied on the site in 1945. In 1964 
an eternal fl ame was placed in front of the monument.
1 See P. Torsti, Divergent Stories, Convergent Attitudes. Study on the Presence 
of History, History Textbooks, and the Thinking of Youth in post-War Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Helsinki: Taifuuni 2003, 45–53.
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When Estonia re-established its independence in 1991, the theme of 
liberation, which formed the core of the Soviet approach to history in 
the Baltic states, was rejected. In this connection, the bronze statue was 
re-named ‘For Those Fallen in the Second World War’. The eternal fl ame 
was put out at the same time and the name of the square was changed 
from ‘Liberators’ Square’ to Tönismägi.2
Preparations for relocating the memorial started after clashes at the 
monument in 2006. In February 2007, the Law on Forbidden Structures 
(which would have banned the public display of monuments glorifying the 
So viet Union or Estonia’s fi fty years of Bolshevism, and aimed specifi cally 
at the Bronze Soldier) was vetoed by the Estonian President,  Toomas 
Hendrik Ilves, who argued that the bill did not comply with the Estonian 
constitution.3 Estonian Russians and Russia voiced their disagreement 
with the bill when it was being discussed in the Parliament.4
According to the latest census (2000) ethnic Russians form 26 per 
cent of the Estonian population. Based on a 2006 estimation, about one 
third of Estonia’s Russian speakers are Estonian citizens, another third 
have Russian citizenship, and around nine per cent are of undefi ned 
citizenship. The Estonian population, which made up 82 per cent of the 
country in 1934, had decreased to 62 per cent by 1991 as a result of mass 
deportations of ethnic Estonians during the Soviet era, together with 
migration into Estonia from other parts of the Soviet Union.5 In the 2000 
census the fi gure was 68 per cent.6 
The job of relocating the statue and the remains of the buried soldiers 
in the Defence Forces Cemetery of Tallinn fi nally started in April 2007, 
2 Helsingin Sanomat (HS), Aljosan lähtöä Tallinnasta edelsi vuoden kestänyt 
riita. 28 Apr. 2007. 
3 International Herald Tribune (IHT), Estonian president vetoes law calling for 
removal of Soviet monument. 22 Feb. 2007. <http://www.iht.com>. 28 Aug. 
2007.
4 HS, 28 Apr. 2007.
5 After the Russian population the biggest ex-Soviet single groups in 2000 were 
Ukrainians (2%) and Belorussians (1%). 
6 UN Demographic Yearbook 2002. Population by national and/or ethnic group, 
sex and urban/Rural residence: each census, 1985–2002. < http://unstats.un.org>. 
27 Nov 2007; U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. 
Background Note: Estonia. <http://www.state.gov>. 27 Aug. 2007.
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just some two weeks before Victory Day on 9 May, the most important 
annual celebration of Estonian Russians. The celebration was to take 
place by the statue. Before the relocation the remains of the soldiers were 
exhumed and identifi ed, and their families were given an opportunity 
to reclaim the remains and bury them elsewhere if they so wished. In 
the absence of the law vetoed by president  Ilves, the relocation was 
based on a different law, which allowed the Estonian authorities to place 
the remains of the buried soldiers and the statue in a less controversial 
location outside the centre of Tallinn. The remains of Red Army soldier 
were an essential factor if the Estonian authorities were to have a legal 
basis for removing the statue. The precise time of the relocation of the 
statue and the graves was not announced in advance. The process started 
when the authorities covered the statue with a tent and encircled the park 
surrounding the statue with riot fences on 26 April.7 
Relocation of the statue and related activities led to controversy in 
particular between Russia and Estonia and internally between Estonian 
Russians and other Estonians. The Estonian embassy in Moscow was 
besieged for a week and violent riots continued in Tallinn for two nights, 
resulting in extensive coverage in the media and international attention.
The diplomatic relationship between Russia and Estonia has generally 
been problematic after Estonia claimed independence. Major disputes 
in recent years have included the borderline dispute between the two 
countries and the planned building of a gas pipe between Russia and 
Germany. Journalists have described Russia’s relations with Estonia and 
its neighbouring Baltic state Latvia as ‘freezing’, and characterised by 
‘diffi culties in agreeing on any minor or major issue’.8
7 K. Kunnas, Viro valmistautuu kaivauksiin sotilaspatsaan luona. Helsingin 
Sanomat (HS), 26 Apr. 2007; K. Kunnas and K. Koponen, Tallinnan sotilaspatsaan 
siirtoa vastustanut mielenosoitus kääntyi mellakaksi. Helsingin Sanomat (HS), 
27 Apr. 2007. 
8 S. Niinivaara and K. Kunnas, Venäjän ja Baltian maiden hyiset suhteet estävät 
yhteistyön. Helsingin Sanomat (HS), 26 Jan. 2006.
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CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK:
HISTORICAL CULTURE AND HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS
IN THE SERVICE OF HISTORY POLITICS
Historical culture presents a form of relating to the past that is open to all 
the people in a society.9 Thus, in contrast to academic historical research, 
it is not a professional relation with the past, but a relation expressed 
through the daily culture of a society. History culture is considered that 
part of the culture in which people face the past and try to come to terms 
with it: the arena/forum for the use of history. It includes mechanisms and 
avenues where knowledge about the past can be produced, transmitted, 
presented, used and experienced within a society. A list of examples for 
avenues of historical culture includes books, cartoons, videos, fi lms, 
novels, museum presentations, contemporary political debates, political 
practises, historical exhibitions, television, personal histories, theatre, 
tourism, advertising, monuments, buildings and so forth.10 
Typically all the defi nitions understand historical culture as having a 
many-sided nature and appearance within the society. Crucially important 
is the understanding that historical culture exists within society in several 
forms as part of the culture, and that historical culture emerges through 
a group of channels, from state approved memorials and curricula to the 
sphere of cultural institutions, architecture and mass consumption.
Although we defi ne historical culture as ‘the forum/arena where 
history can be used’, it is important to emphasize that the idea of ‘using 
history’ here serves only as a tool for understanding, not as a condition 
9 Historical culture (Geschichtskultur) as a concept became part of the history 
discussions in Germany in the 1980s, and therefore the German interpretation of 
its content has been very infl uential.
10 S. Hentilä, ’Historiapolitiikka – Holocaust ja historian julkinen käyttö’, in J. 
Kalela and I. Lindroos, Ilari (eds.), Jokapäiväinen historia. Helsinki: Suomalaisen 
kirjallisuuden seura 2001, 26–49, 32. K. Füssman, H. T. Grütner and J. Rüsen 
(eds.), Historische Faszination. Geschichtkultur heute. Köln, Weimar and Wien: 
Böhlau 1994. P. Aronsson, ‘Historiekultur i förändring’, in P. Aronsson (ed.), 
Makten över minnet. Historiekultur I förändring. Lund: Studentliteratur 2000, 7–
33. S. Ahonen, ‘Historiakulttuuri, historiantutkimus ja nuorten historiatietoisuus’ 
(History culture, history research and the historical consciousness of youth). Oral 
presentation at the Finnish Historical Society in Helsinki 25  Mar. 2002.
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for historical culture. Historical culture appears as a collective concept 
for all kinds of products and narratives through which history exists in the 
daily culture, regardless of whether one can detect active and intentional 
attempts ‘to use history’. The product-nature of historical culture is 
essential; we are talking about usable cultural products and commonly 
held stories (e.g. myths) of the society or smaller groups, which embody 
the historical culture of a society. 
Historical culture can of course be analysed in different ways. We can 
be interested in different forms of historical culture, which seem central 
in different societies, or in changes in historical culture over time. 
Defi nitions of historical consciousness (historische Bewusstsein), 
have varied among scholars within Europe. The most commonly held 
defi nition among German and Scandinavian scholars11 has characterised 
historical consciousness as ‘a complex connection of interpretations of 
the past, perceptions of the present and expectations of the future’.12 
Following this defi nition,  Sirkka Ahonen has described historical 
consciousness as ‘the rational way in which humans are connected 
with temporality’ thus echoing the modern understanding of time.13 
Historical consciousness can help one orientate oneself in time; knowing 
and understanding the past can help one comprehend the present and 
infl uence future expectations. Thus historical consciousness is the way 
people and communities deal with the past in order to understand the 
present and future. Historical consciousness links the past and the future, 
and can construct a sense of continuity. 
Analysing historical consciousness and its dimensions can be seen as 
cognitive history research which attempts to understand the mechanics 
of history politics and the meanings people attach to various aspects of 
the past.
This leads us to the third concept, History politics (Geschichtspolitik), 
which is the key concept of this article.  Habermas introduced the concept 
11 See for example J. Rüsen, Historische Orientirung: über die Arbeit des Ge-
schichtsbewusstseins, sich in der Zeit zurechtzufi nden. Köln: Böhlau 1994; G. 
Schneider (ed.), Geschichtsbewusstsein und historisch-politisches Lernen. 
Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus 1988.
12 M. Angvik and B. von Borries (eds.), Youth and History, A Comparative 
European Survey on Historical Consciousness and Political Attitudes among 
Adolescents. Habburg: Körber Stiftung 1997, A22, A36.
13 Ahonen, ‘Historiakulttuuri, historiantutkimus ja nuorten historia tietoisuus’.
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to refer to those conservative historians who in his opinion had used their 
professional skills, knowledge and positions for political interests when 
attempting to explain Nazi Germany not as part of ‘normal’ German 
history, but as an ‘Asian act’ which followed Stalin’s persecutions.14
In my earlier works I have relied on the defi nition of history politics 
that emphasizes its active and conscious nature; the use of history for 
certain purposes is intentional, history is used for certain purposes. 
History politics is about using the results of history research, commonly 
held ideas and conceptions of history or products of historical culture to 
support and legitimise certain arguments and aims in the current situation. 
History politics is not a form of relating to the past but rather a societal 
phenomenon characterised by the interests and aims that direct the use of 
history in a society.15
In relation to historical culture and historical consciousness, history 
politics can be understood as a second level category, which makes use 
of different forms of relating to history because of political interests and 
purposes.16 This leads to the idea that in a way history politics is based on 
a conscious or unconscious understanding of historical consciousness as 
something that a) can be infl uenced (ie. through historical culture) and b) 
can be appealed to, for example, for political purposes. 
Producing historical culture is history politics in the same way as 
producing curricula is education politics. In an open society history 
politics can be practised not only by authorities in the form of school 
textbooks, museums and monuments, but also by such actors as journalists 
or non-governmental associations.
Finally, the interest in history politics is related to goals that seem 
to direct it. In his recent work  Hentilä has further developed the idea of 
the intentionality of history politics by stating that history can be used to 
support political structures even without the actors’ awareness of using 
14 J. Habermas, Eine Art Schadensabwicklung. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 
1987, 137–148.
15 Torsti, Divergent Stories, 52. Hentilä, ‘Historiapolitiikka – Holocaust, 33. See
also S. Hentilä, Harppi-Saksan haarukassa. DDR:n poliittinen vaikutus Suomes-
sa. Helsinki: SKS 2004, 307. 
16 Torsti, Divergent Stories, 53.
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history as part of their arguments. In such cases, intentionality is a hidden 
yet relevant subject for analysis.17 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BRONZE SOLDIER AS PART OF
HISTORICAL CULTURE AND HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS
The Bronze Soldier in Estonia is a classic product of the historical culture 
constructed by the previous regime. Even after the regime change it has 
continued to form an arena or forum where history is being displayed. 
The importance of the Bronze Soldier monument as a historical cultural 
product for the Russian-speaking Estonians and in particular for the 
World War II Red Army war veterans is demonstrated through its use as 
a place for celebrating historically signifi cant dates. The celebration of 
Victory Day on 9 May and Liberation of Tallinn Day on 22 September 
have gathered war veterans displaying other products of historical culture, 
namely Soviet fl ags and symbols.18 
A competing historical culture has also appeared at the monument. 
A non-violent group of Estonians with fl ags and other Estonian symbols 
approached the celebrating Red Army veterans on 9 May 2006. Police 
led the Estonian group away but the angry comments among the public 
continued, with threats to blow up the monument unless authorities 
removed it.19
Thus the statue debate in Estonia provides a good example of the 
dynamics between history politics, historical culture and historical 
consciousness. In this case the Bronze Soldier statue and the Victory Day 
celebration, both important products of historical culture, were subject 
to a political decision offi cially aimed at lessening possible tensions at 
the site of the statue. But the decision was also a clear message from the 
Estonian authorities as to who presently controls historical culture. 
Here we can note the law vetoed by President  Ilves, which would 
have allowed for the removal of all visible history culture from the 
17 Hentilä, Harppi-Saksan haarukassa, 307.
18 BBC News, Estonia split over WWII memorial. 15 Feb. 2007. <http://news.
bbc.co.uk>. 28 Aug. 2007. 
19 Several articles in the Estonian newspaper Postimees. Quoted in Wikipedia.
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Soviet era. This act of President  Ilves also demonstrates the importance 
of control in relation to historical culture. Historical culture can also be 
evaluated. For example, historical culture in Germany has been evaluated 
as open and able to handle its diffi cult and painful past. Such openness 
can be considered as one of the fundamental conditions for democratic 
development, and the greater the stability of a democracy, the more 
critical, open and permissive the historical culture. Such a historical 
culture is also able to tolerate disagreements and confl icts.20 Clearly, the 
historical culture has not been open in Estonia as regards the Bronze 
Soldier dispute.
From the point of view of historical consciousness we can look at the 
Bronze Soldier case as an example in which the parallel between past 
and present thinking can be observed among both Estonian Russians and 
ethnic Estonians. 
As noted, the Bronze Soldier has signifi cant symbolic value to 
Estonia’s community of ethnic Russians. In regard to the past, it 
symbolises the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. The Russian-speaking 
population views Estonia’s annexation to the Soviet Union as a legitimate 
process connected to the defeat of Nazism by the Red army. This is 
based on the offi cial position of the Russian federation.21 In regard to 
the present, the statue symbolises Estonian Russians’ claim to rights in 
Estonia, in particular to language rights and their right to live in Estonia 
as descendants of those who liberated the country from fascism. Past and 
present thinking are thus interconnected.22 
On the other hand, many Estonians consider the Bronze Soldier a 
symbol of Soviet occupation and repression. In terms of the present 
20 Hentilä, ‘Historiapolitiikka – Holocaust’, 47–48.
21 Since Russian-speakers do not have their own television channels in Estonia it 
is also quite understandable that they continue to form their political views on the 
basis of offi cial Russian positions as communicated through the Russian media, 
which they continue to follow. K. Kunnas, Ei mitään voiton päiviä, Helsingin 
Sanomat (HS), 6 May 2007. 
22 L. Hietanen, Venäläiset jättivät jäähyväisiä pronssipatsaalle, Taloussanomat 
26 Apr. 2007 <http://www.taloussanomat.fi /ulkomaat>, 28 Aug. 2007, K. 
Kunnas, Kenen patsas, Helsingin Sanomat, Sunnuntai, 29 Apr. 2007. A. Daniel, 
The problem is how to live together if the two peoples have such a different 
memory, REGNUM News Agency 4 May 2007, in: <http://en.wikipedia.org/>, 
24 Aug. 2007.
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day attitudes of Estonians, many commentators saw the relocation of 
the statue as a demonstration of the unwillingness of Estonians to allow 
Russians to integrate and assimilate into Estonian society.23
In both cases we can also note Braembussche’s defi nition of historical 
consciousness, which is slightly different and more critical than the simple 
notion of historical consciousness as describing the connection between 
past, present and future. Braembussche has namely emphasised the role 
of the present in his defi nitions of historical consciousness; people are 
reminded of past experience through its presence in the current situation. 
Historical consciousness may also illustrate how an individual or a 
community attempts to deal with the past in the current situation. For 
 Braembussche, a historical experience is about attempting to reconstruct 
the past, while historical consciousness constructs the past because of 
the present. Thus historical consciousness ‘forgets’ parts of the historical 
experience. This forgetting can lead to historical traumas when people 
are faced with a diffi cult situation (e.g. the holocaust). According to 
Braembussche, historical consciousness should not ‘forget’ possible 
traumas but instead work them out. If historical traumas are not worked 
out, the memory of the traumas has a tendency to become mythical and 
an object of taboo formation.24
In the case of Estonia there seems to be the danger of such historical 
consciousness being prevalent among both major groups of the society. 
Ethnic Estonians focus on the independent Estonian state, and consider 
the past Soviet occupation as the anti-image (and Estonian Russians 
as part of it). They sometimes fail to see that Russians in Estonia were 
also victims of the system brought to Estonia as part of Soviet politics. 
On the other hand, Estonian Russians, in order to defend their right to 
exist in Estonia, focus their past-related thinking on the victory of the 
Soviets over the Nazis, a commonly acknowledged enemy, and fail to 
acknowledge the need to reconsider the Soviet version of the history of 
World War II.25 
23 Ibid.
24 A. Braembussche, ‘History and memory – Some comments on recent 
developments’, in P. Kettunen, A. Kultanen and T. Soikkanen (eds.), Jäljillä. 
Kirjoituksia historian ongelmista. Osa 1. Turku: Kirja-Aurora 2000, 76, 80, 84, 
87–88.
25 BBC News. Views diverge on Estonia’s history. 27 Apr. 2007. <http://news.
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An opinion poll gives us further information about the attitudes of 
Estonians towards the Bronze Soldier dispute and differences between 
the groups within the society. The poll conducted 5-22 April 2007 
showed that 37 per cent of the population supported the relocation of 
the monument while 49 per cent were against it and 14 per cent had not 
formed opinion on the subject. Forty-nine per cent of Estonian speakers 
and only nine per cent of Russian speakers supported the relocation.26 
INTERNAL HISTORY POLITICS:
THE RUSSIAN SS-CAMPAIGN AND ESTONIAN RESPONSE
History politics is an overall concept that can be seen to include historical 
culture and historical consciousness. History politics can attempt to 
infl uence the kind of historical culture that is created or destroyed. 
Relocation of the Bronze Soldier in itself is naturally an intentional act, 
and as such history politics whose object is the product of historical 
culture, namely the statue. In the case of historical consciousness we 
can see, for example, Russian television as making history politics and 
thereby attempting to infl uence the historical consciousness of Estonian 
Russians. 
In the following I have collected public statements and comments on 
the Estonian Bronze Statue dispute. The selection is not exhaustive. It is 
based on the collection available on Wikipedia in August 2007, as well 
as on articles I collected during the dispute. It serves to demonstrate how 
different history-political motives can be observed in the comments of 
various countries and communities.
The major history-political campaign was carried out in the Russian 
media. Allegations against Estonia of fascism, glorifi cation of the 
collaboration with Nazi Germany, glorifi cation of Nazism, resurrection 
of Nazism and pro-Nazism came from offi cial Russian spokesmen, 
religious leaders and associations.27 
bbc.co.uk >. 28 Aug. 2007. 
26 Wikipedia.
27 Voice of Russia. Estonia is Encouraging a Resurgence of Nazism in Europe. 
10 Nov. 2006. <http://www.ruvr.ru>. 29 Aug. 2007, The Daily Telegraph. Estonia 
Why do History Politics Matter?
29
For example, the Federation Council of Russia approved a statement 
which urged the Russian authorities to take the ‘toughest possible 
measures’ against Estonia: The dismantling of the monument on the eve 
of Victory Day on 9 May was ‘just one aspect of the policy, disastrous for 
Estonians, being conducted by provincial zealots of Nazism,’…. ‘These 
admirers of Nazism forget that politicians come and go, while the peoples 
in neighbouring countries are neighbours for eternity. The dismantling 
of the monument and the mockery of the remains of the fallen soldiers 
is just more evidence of the vengeful policy toward Russians living in 
Estonia and toward Russia’.28 Thus we can see direct references to the 
present situation using the past as part of the argument.
History politics was also practiced on Youtube, where a number of 
video clips fi lmed with cell phone cameras appeared under the keyword 
eSStonia. The clips mainly supported the claims of police brutality 
during the riots.29 According to an Estonian newspaper most of the clips 
were mislabeled, thus serving as mere propaganda in trying to present the 
recorded incidents as evidence for anti-rioters’ brutal violence.30
The Russian Ambassador to Estonia,  Nikolay Uspensky, declined an 
invitation to attend the reburial of the exhumed remains of those soldiers 
buried at the time when the Bronze Soldier was erected, who had not 
been claimed by their families. The Ambassador claimed, again referring 
to history, that his non-attendance was an ‘expression of Russias highest-
level disapproval of the removal of the monument, the exhumation, 
and the accompanying attempts to revise history to suit the political 
conjuncture’.31 
Russia’s chief rabbi  Berl Lazar, who conducted one of the reburials 
of the soldiers buried at the site, denounced all statements describing 
blames memorial violence on Russia. 1 May 2007. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk>. 
29 Aug. 2007, Interfax, Europe must assess neo-Nazism in Estonia - Kokoshin. 
13 Nov. 2006. <http://www.interfax.ru>
28 Interfax 27 Apr. 2007. Quoted in Wikipedia.
29 Youtube. <http://www.youtube.com>. 29 Aug. 2007.
30 T. Aug. Vandaalide videod koguvad Youtube´is vaatajaid. Eesti Paevaleht. 29 
Apr. 2007. <http://epl.ee>. 29 Aug. 2007.
31 K. Kunnas, Venäjä jää pois Viron hallituksen järjestämästä muistopäivän 
juhlasta. Helsingin Sanomat (HS), 8 May 2007, Postimees, Ümbermatmisel 
osales Vene sõjaväeatašee, 3 Jul. 2007. <postimees.ee>. 30 Aug. 2007.
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the Soviet soldiers as occupants and called on the Estonian authorities 
to review their position regarding the reburial of the remains of Soviet 
soldiers in Tallinn. Making direct parallels between past and present and 
thus appealing to the historical consciousness of people, he said that ‘when 
Nazism unfortunately rears its ugly head in Europe today and as there 
have been attempts to deny the Holocaust, Estonia is acting in a manner 
that insults memory, which alarms us’, adding that ‘the Jewish people 
will always regard what the Soviet soldiers did as a heroic feat’.32
The Russian Congress of Jewish Religious Organizations and 
Associations (KEROOR) also issued a history political statement 
criticizing the Estonian government for relocating a Soviet WWII memorial 
in Tallinn and for alleged Nazi sympathies: ‘The demonstratively defi ant 
form in which the Estonian authorities have dismantled the Monument 
to the Liberator Warrior and are relocating the nearby grave of soldiers 
who gave their lives fi ghting fascism is not an accidental or spontaneous 
act,’ the KEROOR said. ‘Estonian authorities prefer to gloss over the 
fact that punitive detachments and the Estonian SS legion killed between 
120,000 and 140,000 Russians, Jews, Ukrainians, Belarussians, Gypsies, 
and people of other ethnic groups during 1941-1944.’33
The Estonian side attempted to undermine the historical arguments 
of Russia and Russians and focused its on hooliganism. President  Ilves 
stated that ‘All this had nothing to do with the inviolability of graves or 
keeping alive the memory of men fallen in the Second World War….The 
common denominator of last night’s criminals was not their nationality, 
but their desire to riot, vandalize and plunder’.34 Prime Minister  Andrus 
Ansip said in a televised address in Estonian and in Russian that the 
memory of dead soldiers was not served when ‘a picture of a drunk 
shoplifter is being shown all over the world.’35 
32 Interfax. Russia’s chief rabbi urges Estonia to reconsider Soviet soldiers’ 
reburial. 7 May 2007. < http://www.interfax-religion.com>. 29 Aug. 2007.
33 Interfax. Russian Jewish community slams Estonia over Soviet war memorial. 
4 May 2007. <http://www.interfax-religion.com>. 29 Aug. 2007.
34 J. Tanner, Estonia Removes Soviet War Memorial, Washington Post, 27 Apr. 
2007. <http://www.washingtonpost.com>. 29 Aug. 2007.
35 Reuters. Estonia calm after Red Army site riots, Russia angry. 28 Apr. 2007. 
<http://www.reuters.com>. 29 Aug. 2007.
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HISTORY POLITICS FROM OUTSIDE: VIEWS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES
Ex-Soviet countries echoed the statements of Russia and Estonia in 
their statements and comments, which all used history to support the 
arguments. The President of the Republic of Lithuania,  Valdas Adamkus, 
announced that Lithuania was concerned and following the events in 
Tallinn. The President expressed his full support for Estonia, appealing to 
history: ‘There is no doubt that respect should be shown to the memory 
of the fallen soldiers. However, the Soviet Army didn’t bring freedom to 
the Baltic states, so can we blame Estonia if the Soviet soldiers’ remains 
from a central Tallinn square are reinterred in another cemetery?’.36
On the other hand, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus defended 
the sentiments of Estonian Russians by referring to the historical suffering 
of Belarus in the Second World War: ‘Belarus is the country that lost 
every third of its citizens during the Second World War. Any outrage 
upon the memory of the victims of that war causes us the sentiments of 
deep indignation and regret. .... We regret that the Estonian leadership 
has failed to have enough political wisdom not to fi ght the dead.’37
The Tajik Council of War Veterans condemned the removal of the 
statue, making a history-political claim that ‘Estonian bureaucrats 
are behaving like fascists’ and the Kyrgyz Parliament condemned the 
dismantling of the monument, calling it ‘an act against history.’38
Representatives of the EU and Nordic countries provided statements 
that mainly supported Estonia. At the time of the Bronze Soldier dispute 
the EU Parliament adopted a formal resolution criticizing Russia’s human 
rights record. In the related debate, history was used to demonstrate the 
strong and united support for Estonia. ‘Today, we are all Estonians’, 
stated  Joseph Daul, the leader of the biggest European party, EPP-DE, 
echoing  John F. Kennedy’s famous phrase in 1963, when he visited 
36 President Urges to Search for New Forms of Cooperation with Russia. Press 
release. <http://www.president.lt>. 27 Aug. 2007.
37 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus. Belarusian MFA Press 
Secretary Andrei Popov Comments to BelTA Information Agency on the Events 
in Estonia. 27 Apr. 2007. <http://www.mfa.gov>. 29 Aug. 2007. 
38 Russian News and Information Agency Novosti, World Russia’s upper house 
calls for cutting ties with Estonia. 27 Apr. 2007. <http://en.rian.ru >. 29 Aug. 
2007, Itar-tas news referred in Wikipedia 24 Aug. 2007.
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West Berlin shortly after East Germany had erected the Berlin wall.39 
Interestingly, however, a different comment was given by the former 
German Chancellor  Gerhard Schröder, who stated that ‘the way Estonia 
is dealing with the memory of young Russian soldiers who lost their lives 
in the fi ght against fascism is in bad taste and irreverent.’40 
Statements by the Nordic countries echoed their historical relations 
with Estonia and Russia and their foreign policies in general.  Carl Bildt, 
minister of foreign affairs in Sweden, said that what was happening in 
Estonia was an internal matter and that the outcome formed an intricate 
part of Estonia’s independence. He said he had faith in the Estonians 
to sort it out and that he believed it to be important that they did so 
themselves, without international interference. Carl Bildt also pointed 
out that he understood why the popular reaction about the statue had 
been so ‘sharp’.41 Finnish Prime Minister  Matti Vanhanen followed suit 
but put more emphasis on the willingness of the Finnish government 
to remain neutral than on the importance of local democratic process 
in Estonia, which was the emphasis of Sweden: ‘Neither Finland nor 
other countries need to get involved. As they [events] are occurring in an 
area near Finland, then we will of course keep a very close eye on them 
[events].…It is not part of international protocol for politicians to request 
the resignation of a foreign government’s ministry, it just isn’t suitable.’42 
 Jonas Gahr Støre, Norway’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, stressed in 
his announcement the importance that both sides stop the violence and 
respect each other.43
Finally, as a curiosity I include the statement of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Serbia to demonstrate how a dispute such as the Bronze Soldier 
case in Estonia enables different actors to voice their own history political 
39 European Parliament. Wednesday in Plenary: EU’s relations with Russia 
centre stage. 10 May 2007. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu>. 29 Aug. 2007.
40 M&C News, German ex-chancellor condemns Estonia war memorial removal. 
27 Apr. 2007. <http://news.monstersandcritics.com>. 29 Aug. 2007.
41 Alla dessa dagar. Tallinn. <http://carlbildt.wordpress.com>. 29 Aug. 2007, 
C. Svahn, Bildt talade med presidenten. Dagend Nyheter 29 Apr. 2007. <http://
www.dn.se>. 29 Aug. 2007.
42 Helsingin Sanomat (HS), Vanhanen tyrmää venäläisten vaatimukset Viron 
hallituksen erosta. 1 May 2007.
43 Aftenposten 27 Apr. 2007. Referred to in Wikipedia.
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views. Here we see Serbia, in its reference to history, as displaying itself 
along with Germany as the great condemner of Nazi atrocities. The offi cial 
statement states: ‘The future of Europe is also based on full commitment 
to the shared and best pages of European history, whereas the victory 
over nazism and fascism more than half a century ago undoubtedly ranks 
among those pages deserving lasting admiration among all in Europe and 
in the world.’ Condemning the unilateral action by Estonian authorities 
on the eve of 9 May as contrary to this commitment, it continues: ‘The 
highest respect for such monuments in today’s Germany is noteworthy. 
We in Serbia shall forever place fl owers on the graves of the Red Army 
soldiers fallen in the battles for the liberation of Serbia and Belgrade 
from Nazi occupiers. We shall do so also on 9 May this year.’44
WHY DO HISTORY POLITICS MATTER?
History politics matter because we can often observe the concrete 
consequences of history being used for political purposes. In the 
exemplary case of this article, the Estonian Bronze Soldier dispute in 
May 2007, we can itemise at least fi ve types of consequences.
The fi rst, very serious consequence was the violent protests which led 
to the worst riots and looting Estonia has seen since its independence in 
1991. Hundreds of people were arrested and police had to use force to 
stop the riots that lasted for two nights. Many people were also injured 
and one person died as a result of the violent riots.45
The second consequence was the enormous material losses caused by 
the riots and looting. According to  Edgar Savisaar, the Mayor of Tallinn, 
the direct losses exceeded 40-50 million Estonian kroons (2,5-3 million 
euros).46
The third consequence was the losses suffered by Estonian businesses 
as a result of the dispute. In late April 2007, three large Russian 
supermarket networks, Seventh Continent, Kopeika and Samokhval, 
banned all Estonian commodities, and in May 2007 Moscow’s mayor, 
44 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia. Referred to in Wikipedia.
45 K. Kunnas, Viron poliisi varautui uusiin mellakoihin Tallinnan keskustassa. 
28 Apr. 2007. http://www.hs.fi /arkisto. 30 Aug. 2007.
46 Delfi . Referred to in Wikipedia.
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 Yury Luzhkov, proposed to boycott everything related to Estonia for 
‘actions taken against the Bronze Soldier Monument and graves of our 
soldiers’. He said that Russian companies should cut off their relations 
with partners in Estonia. ‘One should tell our business: stop contacts with 
Estonia. The country showed its negative, and I would say fascist face,’ 
the mayor said, adding: ‘No one will be able to re-write history.’47 
The fourth consequence was related to the EU and foreign policies. 
The EU-Russia Summit took place some three weeks after the relocation 
of the Bronze Soldier and related events. The hoped-for cooperation 
agreement between the EU and Russia was not reached, one of the 
reasons being the Bronze Soldier dispute in Tallinn, and the willingness 
of the European Union to show support for its member state Estonia.48 
The fi fth and perhaps most important consequence of this history 
political dispute was that it revealed underlying social problems. The 
International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights stated that ‘the 
riots in Tallinn and other Estonian cities served to highlight remaining 
problems relating to the integration of the country’s Russian-speaking 
minority, which constitutes about one third of the 1.4 million residents. 
Despite a number of important legislative reforms since the fi rst years 
of independence, this minority is still not offi cially recognized as a 
linguistic minority and continues to face discrimination and exclusion 
in everyday life, thus fostering frustration and resentment among 
its members. Many Russian-speakers still lack Estonian citizenship, 
Russian-language education has gradually been reduced and stringent 
language requirements restrict access to the labor market for Russian-
speakers.’49
This illustrates the idea about the necessary role of the present situation 
in regard to interest in the past. In the Estonian case the Russian minority 
hangs on the historical monument of the Bronze Soldier and its location 
at least partly because of their present unresolved social problems in the 
47 Interfax. Luzhkov proposes boycotting Estonia. 1 May 2007. <http://www.
interfax.ru>. 30 Aug. 2007. Lenta.ru internet source 28 Apr. 2007 referred to in 
Wikipedia: <http://lenta.ru/news>. 30 Aug. 2007.
48 Helsingin Sanomat (HS), Venäjän asenne yhdistää EU:ta. 22 May 2007.
49 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights. Estonian Authorities 
Must Investigate Allegations of Police Brutality during War Memorial Riots. 30 
Apr. 2007. <http://www.ihf-hr.org>. 30 Aug. 2007.
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Estonian society. The important notion here is the idea of the politics of 
tomorrow: the major dimension of the infl uence of history is the future 
and politics and decisions related to it.50 Taking a somewhat idealistic 
stance, one had hoped that the events in May 2007 would have led to 
concrete actions, ‘politics of tomorrow’, concerning the social problems 
of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia.
More generally we can note the practical consequences of history 
politics in different parts of the world. History textbook battles in China, 
Japan and India have led to riots in Gujarat and to attacks on Japanese 
companies and products in China.51 The most extreme form of violence, 
war, can be largely motivated by utilising history politics as part of 
propaganda. The former Yugoslavia provides sad examples of this. In 
Poland, but also in other post-socialist countries, history politics has 
recently led to legislation enabling political purges of those involved in 
the communist system.52
I would conclude by stating that because history politics matters in a 
very concrete sense in societies, the analysis of history political interests 
should be seen as one important dimension of historical research. The 
objects of history political research are the different ideas of history held 
by individuals and communities and the motives behind those ideas. 
I would very much agree with the thesis that historical research has a 
two-level mission: the production of new historical knowledge and the 
analysis of the history political interests related to that knowledge.53 
Therefore an understanding of the notion of history politics in relation 
to history research is vital for historians as well as for active citizens of 
societies.
50 Hentilä, Harppi-Saksan haarukassa, 308–309.
51 History teaching shapes identity. Oxford Analytica – International. 9 Aug. 
2005.
52 Boston Globe, Eastern Europe confronts its communist past. Russia warns of 
souring relations if statues removed. 24 Apr. 2007. <http://www.boston.com>. 
30 Aug. 2007.
53 Hentilä, Harppi-Saksan haarukassa, 308.
